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Semi-quantum key distribution (SQKD) can share secret keys by using less quantum resource than
its fully quantum counterparts, and this likely makes SQKD become more practical and realizable.
In this paper, we present a new SQKD protocol by introducing the idea of B92 into semi-quantum
key distribution and prove its unconditional security. In this protocol, the sender Alice just sends
one qubit to the classical Bob and Bob just prepares one state in the preparation process. Indeed
the classical user’s measurement is not necessary either. This protocol can reduce some quantum
communication and make it easier to be implemented. It can be seen as the semi-quantum version
of B92 protocol, comparing to the protocol BKM2007 as the semi-quantum version of BB84 in fully
quantum cryptography. We verify it has higher key rate and therefore is more efficient. Specifically
we prove it is unconditionally secure by computing a lower bound of the key rate in the asymptotic
scenario from information theory aspect. Then we can find a threshold value of errors such that for
all error rates less than this value, the secure key can be established between the legitimate users
definitely. We make an illustration of how to compute the threshold value in case of the reverse
channel is a depolarizing one with parameter p. Though the threshold value is a little smaller than
those of some existed SQKD protocols, it can be comparable to the B92 protocol in fully quantum
cryptography.
I. INTRODUCTION
Semi-quantum key distribution (SQKD) is a new tech-
nique to share secure secret keys in quantum world. In
an SQKD, one of the users is restricted to measure, pre-
pare and send qubit in a fixed computational basis. We
call it the semi-quantum or classical user. Boyer et al [1]
designed the first SQKD protocol to share secret keys
between quantum Alice and classical Bob successfully
in 2007 (BKM07). In BKM07 protocol, Alice prepares
qubits in two different basis randomly and sends them to
Bob, and Bob can do two kinds of operations when he
receives the state as follows:
1. SIFT: Bob chooses to measure the qubit and resend
a new one to Alice. He measures the state he re-
ceived in the computational basis Z = {|0〉, |1〉} and
resends the result state to Alice. In other words,
Bob sends the state |i〉(i ∈ {0, 1}) to Alice when he
gets the measurement outcome i.
2. CTRL: Bob chooses to reflect it back. He just
makes the state pass through and returns it to Al-
ice. Under this circumstance, Bob knows nothing
about the transit qubit because he cannot gain any
information.
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When Alice gets the returning state, she measures it in
the Z-basis or X-basis randomly. When Bob chooses to
SIFT and Alice chooses to measure in the Z-basis, they
share a bit.
From the above scheme, we can see that Bob just does
some classical performances, making the SQKD protocol
more practical and realizable. Since the first SQKD was
proposed by Boyer et al. [1], various SQKD protocols
have been provided [2–12]. Specifically, Zou and Qiu et
al. [4] proposed five SQKD protocols with less than four
quantum states based on BKM07 and proved them to be
completely robust. A multi-user protocol was developed
in Ref. [5], establishing secret keys between a quantum
user and several classical ones. In Ref. [6], an SQKD pro-
tocol was proposed based on quantum entanglement. Zou
and Qiu et al. [10] presented an SQKD protocol with-
out invoking the classical party’s measurement ability.
Krawec [9] designed a mediated SQKD protocol allow-
ing two semi-quantum users to share secure secret keys
with the help of a quantum server. Recently, Krawec [12]
has proposed a single-state SQKD protocol, in which the
classical Bob’s reflection can contribute to the raw key.
SQKD protocols mainly rely on a two-way quantum
channel, which leads to the eavesdropper Eve having two
opportunities to attack the transit qubits during their
transmission. This may increase the possibility for Eve to
gain more information on A or B’s raw key and make the
security analysis more complicated. Most of the existing
SQKD protocols are limited to discuss their robustness
rather than unconditional security. A protocol is said to
2be robust if any attacker can get nontrivial information
on A or B’s secret key, the legitimate users can detect his
existing with nonzero probability [3]. Then the robust-
ness of SQKD protocols can only assure any attack can
be detected, but it cannot tell us how much noise the pro-
tocol can tolerate to distill a secure key after applying the
technique of error correction and privacy amplification.
Recently, the situation has been improved. In Ref.
[13], the relationship between the disturbance and the
amount of information gained by Eve was provided un-
der the circumstance that Eve just performs individual
attacks. Krawec [14] proved that any attack operator was
equivalent to a restricted attack in a single-state SQKD
protocol. Then Krawec [15] further proved the uncondi-
tional security of BKM2007 by giving the lower bound
on the key rate in the asymptotic scenario. To the best
of my knowledge, this is the first unconditional security
proof of an SQKD protocol. Furthermore, Krawec [16]
proved the unconditional security of a mediated SQKD
protocol allowing two semi-quantum users to share se-
cure secret key with the help of a quantum server even
under the circumstance that the quantum server is an all-
powerful adversary. Recently, Krawec [12] has provided
an unconditional security proof of a single-state SQKD
protocol.
In this paper, we introduce the idea of B92 into semi-
quantum key distribution and design a new single-state
SQKD protocol. It can be seen as the semi-quantum
version of B92, comparing to the Protocol BKM07 as the
semi-quantum version of BB84 in fully quantum cryp-
tography. Additionally, the classical Bob has no need
to own measurement equipment and the CTRL-bit can
contribute to the raw key, in other words, the classical
Bob’s reflection can contribute to the raw key. All of
these make our protocol to be more practical and effi-
cient. In addition, we prove it to be unconditional secure
by finding a threshold value such that all the error rates
less than this value, the secure keys can be established
definitely.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. First, in
Section 2 we give some preliminaries. Then in Section 3
we present our single-state SQKD protocol. In particular,
in Section 4 we give the unconditional security proof in
detail. Finally in section 5 we make a short conclusion
and give some issues for future consideration.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we give some preliminaries and some
notations which are about to appear in the next sections.
The computational basis denoted as Z basis is the two
state set {|0〉, |1〉}, the Hadamard basis denoted as X
basis is the set {|+〉, |−〉}, where
|+〉 = |0〉+ |1〉√
2
, (1)
|−〉 = |0〉 − |1〉√
2
. (2)
Given a complex number z ∈ C, we denote Re(z) and
Im(z) as its real and imaginary components respectively.
The conjugate of z is denoted as z∗. If U is a complex
matrix (operator), its conjugate transpose (conjugate) is
denoted as U †.
Consider a random variable X . Suppose each realiza-
tion x of X belongs to the set N = {1, 2, · · · , i, · · · , n}.
Let PX(i) be the probability distribution of X . Then the
Shannon entropy of X is
H(X) = H(PX(1), · · · , PX(i), · · · , PX(n)) (3)
= −
n∑
i=1
PX(i) log2(PX(i)).
Note that here we define 0 log2 0 = 0. When N = 2,
H(X) = h(PX(1)), where h(x) = H(x, 1−x) is the Shan-
non binary entropy function.
Let ρ be a density operator acting on an n-dimensional
Hilbert space H satisfying
ρ =
n∑
i=1
λi|i〉〈i|, (4)
where λi(i = 1, 2, · · · , n) is the i-th eigenvalue of ρ and
{|1〉, |2〉, · · · , |n〉} is the standard basis of H. Then we
denote S(ρ) as its von Neumann entropy such that
S(ρ) = H({λi}i) = −
n∑
i=1
λi log2 λi. (5)
Let ρ be a classical quantum state expressed as
ρ =
n∑
i=1
PX(i)|i〉〈i| ⊗ ρi. (6)
Then
S(ρ) = H(PX(i)) +
n∑
i=1
PX(i)S(ρi). (7)
If ρAB is a density operator acting on the bipartite
space HA ⊗ HB , we use S(AB) to denote the von Neu-
mann entropy of ρAB and S(B) the von Neumann en-
tropy of ρB where S(B) = S(trA(ρAB)). We use S(A|B)
to denote the von Neumann entropy of A’s system con-
ditioned by system B such that
S(A|B) = S(AB)− S(B) = S(ρAB)− S(trAρAB).(8)
Let N be the size of A and B’s raw key of an SQKD
protocol, and ℓ(N) < N denotes the size of secure secret
3key distilled after error correction and privacy amplifica-
tion. Let r denote the key rate in the asymptotic scenario
(N →∞). Then
r = lim
N→∞
ℓ(N)
N
≥ inf(S(B|E)−H(B|A)), (9)
where H(B|A) is the conditional Shannon entropy and
the infimum is over all attack strategies an Eve can per-
form [12, 17, 18].
III. THE PROTOCOL
In this section, we present our single-state SQKD pro-
tocol, in which the receiver Bob is limited to be classical.
The protocol consists of the following steps:
1. Alice prepares and sends N quantum states |+〉 to
Bob one by one, where N = 4n(1 + δ), n is the
desired length of the INFO string, and δ > 0 is a
fixed parameter. Alice sends a quantum state only
after receiving the previous one.
2. Bob prepares N2 quantum states |0〉 and generates
a random string KˆB ∈ {0, 1}N to be his candidate
raw key. Bob chooses SIFT or CTRL randomly.
Here CTRL means reflecting it back with no dis-
turbance and SIFT means discarding the state he
received and sending |0〉 to Alice instead.
(1) Define Kˆ
(i)
B = 0, when Bob chooses CTRL.
(2) Define Kˆ
(i)
B = 1, when Alice chooses SIFT.
3. Alice also generates a random string KˆA ∈
{0, 1,−1}N to be her candidate raw key. When
she measures the i-th quantum state in the Z basis
and gets the outcome 1, she sets Kˆ
(i)
A = 0. When
she measures the i-th quantum state in the X ba-
sis and gets the outcome −, she sets Kˆ(i)A = 1.
Otherwise, she sets Kˆ
(i)
A = −1. Then we can get
P (Kˆ
(i)
A = −1) = 12 , where P (x) denotes the proba-
bility of x.
4. Alice announces Bob to drop all the iterations when
Kˆ
(i)
A = −1 through authenticated classical channel
shared previously. Then Alice and Bob will get
KA,KB ∈ {0, 1}l to be their raw key respectively.
Then l is expected to approximate N2 . They abort
the protocol when l < 2n.
5. Bob chooses at random n bits from his raw key KB
to be TEST bits and announces their positions and
values respectively by the authenticated classical
channel. Alice checks the error rate on the TEST
bits. If it is higher than some predefined threshold
value PT , they abort the protocol.
6. Alice and Bob select the first n remaining bits of
KA and KB respectively to be their INFO string.
7. Alice announces ECC (error correction code) and
PA (privacy amplification) data, she and Bob use
them to extract the m-bit final key from the n-bit
INFO string.
Note that, we can make the classical Bob to prepare
qubit |1〉 instead of |0〉 when he SIFTs the qubit. Corre-
spondingly, Alice should set KˆiA = 0 when she measures
in Z basis and gets measurement outcome 0.
Next, we prove our protocol is correct. Assume KiA =
0, according to the protocol, we will conclude that Alice
performs measurement in the computational basis and
gets the outcome 1. Then we can infer that the qubit she
received is bound to be |+〉 if there is no disturbance.
Therefore, Bob’s raw key bit KiB should be 0 definitely.
When KiA = 1, Alice measures in the X basis and gets
the result −. Then we can infer Alice’s receiving qubit
is |0〉 definitely. Consequently, KiB = 1. From the above
protocol, we can see Alice’s raw key bit KiA is perfectly
correlated to Bob’s raw key bit KiB in each iteration in
case of no disturbance exists. Then we can conclude that
our protocol is correct.
In order to illustrate a protocol’s efficiency uniformly,
we define a parameter ℓ = limn→∞
n
N
, where n is the
length of INFO string and N is the number of qubit
transmitted in the quantum channel, including the for-
ward and reverse channel. Then we can get our protocol’s
efficiency parameter ℓ = 18 .
Compared with the single-state SQKD protocol in [4],
the classical Bob’s measurement equipment can be re-
moved, which makes our protocol is easier to imple-
mented. Besides, the CTRL bits can contribute to the
raw key, which makes our protocol get higher key rate to
be more efficient. Specifically, the efficiency parameter ℓ
of protocol in [4] is 116 .
In comparison with the protocol in [10], Alice just
sends one qubit to Bob and Bob just prepares one state
in the preparation process in each iteration, which makes
our protocol be able to reduce some quantum communi-
cations. Additionally, our protocol is more efficient be-
cause the CTRL bits can contribute to the raw key. The
efficiency parameter ℓ of the protocol in [10] is less than
1
12 .
With respect to Krawec’s newly protocol in [12], the
classical Bob can be further restricted to have no mea-
surement ability and he just prepares one state when
choosing to SIFT in our protocol. In addition, some it-
erations have to be discarded to balance the probability
of Bob’s raw key bits in Krawec’s protocol which makes
it less efficient inevitably.
In order to make a clear illustration, we using TABLE
I to demonstrate the main advantages compared to some
existed semi-quantum key distribution protocols as fol-
lows:
From TABLE I, we can see our single-state SQKD pro-
tocol is not only more efficient but also easier to imple-
ment. Next, we show it is also unconditionally secure.
4i
i′
1′ 2′ 3′ 4′ 5′
1 {|0〉, |1〉, |+〉, |−〉} Y {|0〉, |1〉} N 1
16
2 |+〉 Y {|0〉, |1〉} N 1
16
3 {|0〉, |1〉, |+〉, |−〉} N {|0〉, |1〉} N less than 1
12
4 |+〉 Y {|0〉, |1〉} Y 3
28
5 |+〉 N {|0〉} Y 1
8
TABLE I. Comparison of our protocol with some existed
ones. Notations: 1 protocol BKM07; 2 Zou’s single-state
protocol in Ref [4]; 3 Zou’s protocol in Ref [10]; 4 Krawec’s
single-state protocol in Ref [12]; 5 our single-state protocol;
1′ quantum states prepared by the sender; 2′ the classical re-
ceiver measures the received qubits or not; 3′ quantum states
generated by the receiver; 4′ CTRL-bit contributes to the raw
key or not; 5′ the efficiency parameter ℓ.
IV. SECURITY PROOF
Firstly, we restrict our security proof on Eve’s collec-
tive attack. Then we spread it into the circumstance
of general attack. Collective attack is a typical attack
strategy that Eve performs the same operation in each
iteration of the protocol and postpones to measure her
ancilla until any future time. General attack (coherent
attack or joint attack) is a kind of more powerful attack
that Eve can perform any operation allowed by the laws
of quantum physics and postpone her measurement all
by herself [20].
A. Modeling the protocol
We use HA, HB and HE to denote Alice, Bob and
Eve’s Hilbert spaces respectively. HT is the Hilbert space
of the transit states. Generally, they are all assumed to
be finite. In order to make a clear illustration, we just
take one iteration for example to prove the unconditional
security.
Krawec [14] has pointed out any collective attack
(UF , UR) is equivalent to a restricted operation (b, U)
where b ∈ (− 12 , 12 ) in a single-state SQKD protocol. UF
and UR denote the attack operator performed by Eve in
the forward and reverse channel respectively. U is an
unitary operator acting on the joint system HT ⊗ HE .
We describe the restriction attack strategy as follows:
1. Alice prepares and sends state |+〉T to Bob through
the forward channel. Eve intercepts |+〉T and re-
sends another state |e〉T prepared by herself to Bob,
where
|e〉T =
√
1
2
+ b|0〉T +
√
1
2
− b|1〉T . (10)
2. Bob has two choices when he receives the state |e〉T .
CTRL : Bob chooses to reflect |e〉T back to Alice
undisturbed through the reverse channel. Mean-
while, Eve captures the transit state and probes it
using unitary operator U acting on the transit state
and her own ancilla state. After that Eve resends
the transit state to Alice and keeps the ancilla state
in her own memory.
SIFT: Bob chooses to discard the state |e〉T and
send |0〉T to Alice instead. Eve can also perform
the same attack during the transmission.
The parameter b can specify the amount of noise intro-
duced in the forward channel. It can be observed by the
legitimate users. Eve probes the state by using a unitary
operator U to act on HT ⊗HE as follows:
U |0, 0〉TE = |0, e00〉TE + |1, e01〉TE , (11)
U |1, 0〉TE = |0, e10〉TE + |1, e11〉TE . (12)
Since U is unitary, we can derive that
〈e00|e10〉E + 〈e01|e11〉E = 0, (13)
〈e00|e00〉E + 〈e01|e01〉E = 1, (14)
〈e10|e10〉E + 〈e11|e11〉E = 1. (15)
In order to illustrate Eve’s attack under the circum-
stance Bob chooses CTRL and Alice chooses to measure
in X basis, we express |e〉 in X basis as
|e〉T = α+ β√
2
|+〉T + α− β√
2
|−〉T , (16)
α =
√
1
2
+ b, β =
√
1
2
− b. (17)
According to Eqs. (11) and (12), we can get
U |+, 0〉TE = |+, f+0〉TE + |−, f+1〉TE , (18)
U |−, 0〉TE = |+, f−0〉TE + |−, f−1〉TE , (19)
where
|f+0〉E = 1
2
(|e00〉E + |e01〉E + |e10〉E + |e11〉E), (20)
|f+1〉E = 1
2
(|e00〉E − |e01〉E + |e10〉E − |e11〉E), (21)
|f−0〉E = 1
2
(|e00〉E + |e01〉E − |e10〉E − |e11〉E), (22)
|f−1〉E = 1
2
(|e00〉E − |e01〉E − |e10〉E + |e11〉E). (23)
Then we can get
U |e, 0〉TE = |+, g+〉TE + |−, g−〉TE , (24)
5where
|g+〉E = α√
2
|e00〉E + α√
2
|e01〉E (25)
+
β√
2
|e10〉E + β√
2
|e11〉E ,
|g−〉E = α√
2
|e00〉E − α√
2
|e01〉E (26)
+
β√
2
|e10〉E − β√
2
|e11〉E .
Next, we model one valid iteration of this protocol as
follows:
1. Alice prepares and sends |+〉T to Bob through the
forward channel:
ρ1T = |+〉〈+|T . (27)
2. Eve performs the restricted operation on the transit
state
ρ2T = UF |+〉〈+|TU∗F = |e〉〈e|T . (28)
3. Bob’s action:
(1) SIFT:
ρ3BT = |1〉〈1|B ⊗ |0〉〈0|T . (29)
(2) CTRL:
ρ4BT = |0〉〈0|B ⊗ |e〉〈e|T . (30)
Because Bob chooses SIFT or CTRL randomly,
P (SIFT) = P (CTRL) = 12 . Therefore, the state
after Bob’s operation is
ρ5BT =
1
2
|0〉〈0|B ⊗ |e〉〈e|T + 1
2
|1〉〈1|B ⊗ |0〉〈0|T . (31)
4. Eve’s attack in the reverse channel:
(1) SIFT:
P (|x〉) = |x〉〈x|, (32)
ρ6BTE = |1〉〈1|B ⊗ U |0, 0〉〈0, 0|TEU∗ (33)
= |1〉〈1|B ⊗ P (|0, e00〉TE + |1, e01〉TE).
(2) CTRL:
ρ7BTE = |0〉〈0|B ⊗ U |e, 0〉〈e, 0|TEU∗ (34)
= |0〉〈0|B ⊗ P (|+, g+〉TE + |−, g−〉TE).
Then the mixed state after Eve’s attack is
ρ8BTE =
1
2
ρ6BTE +
1
2
ρ7BTE . (35)
5. Alice measures in Z or X basis randomly:
(1) Measure in Z basis:
σ9ABE = |0〉〈0|A ⊗ |1〉〈1|B ⊗
1
2
|e01〉〈e01|E (36)
+|0〉〈0|A ⊗ |0〉〈0|B ⊗ 1
4
P (|g+〉E − |g−〉E).
(2) Measure in X basis:
σ10ABE = |1〉〈1|A ⊗ |0〉〈0|B ⊗
1
2
|g−〉〈g−|E (37)
+ |1〉〈1|A ⊗ |1〉〈1|B ⊗ 1
4
P (|e00〉E − |e01〉E).
Note that σ9ABE and σ
10
ABE may not be normalized
here. Then the state after Alice’s measurement is
ρ11ABE =
1
K
[σ9ABE + σ
10
ABE ], (38)
K = tr(σ9ABE + σ
10
ABE). (39)
Let P (i, j) denote the probability that the event A and
B’s raw key bits are i and j, respectively. Then we can
get
P (0, 0) =
1
4K
tr(P (|g+〉E − |g−〉E)) (40)
=
1
4K
(1− 2Re〈g+|g−〉),
P (0, 1) =
1
2K
tr(|e01〉〈e01|) = 1
2K
〈e01|e01〉, (41)
P (1, 0) =
1
2K
tr(|g−〉〈g−|) = 1
2K
〈g−|g−〉, (42)
P (1, 1) =
1
4K
tr(P (|e00〉E − |e01〉E)) (43)
=
1
4K
(1− 2Re〈e00|e01〉).
P (1, 0) denotes the probability that A’s raw key bit is
1 and B’s raw key bit is 0. In other words, Alice measures
in the X basis and gets the outcome − when Bob chooses
to CTRL. This indicates Alice initially sends |+〉 but
getting |−〉 finally because of the channel noise. We call
it the error rate of X-type denoted as eX . According to
the protocol, we can get
eX = trE [(|−〉〈−| ⊗ I)(U |e, 0〉〈e, 0|TEU∗)] (44)
= 〈g−|g−〉.
Similarly, P (0, 1) denotes the probability that Alice mea-
sures in Z basis and gets the outcome 1 when Bob chooses
to SIFT. We use eZ to denote the error rate of Z-type.
Then we can get
eZ = trE [(|1〉〈1| ⊗ I)(U |0, 0〉〈0, 0|TEU∗)] (45)
= 〈e01|e01〉.
6Here eX and eZ are two statistics that can be observed
by Alice and Bob in the reconciliation stage.
P (i, j) (i, j ∈ {0, 1}) is a probability distribution such
that ∑
i,j
P (i, j) = 1. (46)
Then we can derive
K =
1
4
(1− 2Re〈g+|g−〉) + 1
2
〈e01|e01〉 (47)
+
1
2
〈g−|g−〉+ 1
4
(1− 2Re〈e00|e01〉).
B. Bounding the final key rate
According to Eq. (9), we can see that we can get a
lower bound of the key rate by bounding the von Neu-
mann entropy. Here we also use the expression
r = lim
N→∞
ℓ(N)
N
≥ inf(S(B|E) −H(B|A)) (48)
≥ inf(S(B|ME)−H(B|A)),
which Krawec applied in [12, 15] to give the lower bound
on the key rate due to the strong subadditivity of von
Neumann entropy expressed as
S(B|E) ≥ S(B|ME), (49)
whereM is a new system introduced to form a compound
system ABME. Then we introduce a new system M
modeled by a two dimensional Hilbert space spanned by
the orthonormal basis {|0〉, |1〉}. We use the operator
|i〉〈i|M , i ∈ {0, 1} to record the outcome of performing
an xor operation on A and B’s raw key bit. Considering
the mixed state of the joint system after one iteration is
ρABE =
1
K
[|1〉〈1|A ⊗ |0〉〈0|B ⊗ 1
2
|g−〉〈g−|E (50)
+|1〉〈1|A ⊗ |1〉〈1|B ⊗ 1
4
P (|e00〉E − |e01〉E)
+|0〉〈0|A ⊗ |1〉〈1|B ⊗ 1
2
|e01〉〈e01|E
+|0〉〈0|A ⊗ |0〉〈0|B ⊗ 1
4
P (|g+〉E − |g−〉E)],
then we can get the mixed state of the system ABME:
ρABME =
1
K
[|1, 0〉〈1, 0|AB ⊗ |1〉〈1|M ⊗ 1
2
|g−〉〈g−|E (51)
+|1, 1〉〈1, 1|AB ⊗ |0〉〈0|M ⊗ 1
4
P (|e00〉E − |e01〉E)
+|0, 1〉〈0, 1|AB ⊗ |1〉〈1|M ⊗ 1
2
|e01〉〈e01|E
+|0, 0〉〈0, 0|AB ⊗ |0〉〈0|M ⊗ 1
4
P (|g+〉E − |g−〉E)].
Tracing out the system A, we can get the state ρBME as
ρBME =
1
K
[|0, 0〉〈0, 0|BM ⊗ 1
4
P (|g+〉E − |g−〉E)(52)
+|0, 1〉〈0, 1|BM ⊗ 1
2
|g−〉〈g−|E
+|1, 1〉〈1, 1|BM ⊗ 1
2
|e01〉〈e01|E
+|1, 0〉〈1, 0|BM ⊗ 1
4
P (|e00〉E − |e01〉E)].
Then we get ρME as
ρME = trB(ρBME) (53)
= |0〉〈0|M ⊗ 1
4K
P (|g+〉E − |g−〉E)
+|0〉〈0|M ⊗ 1
4K
P (|e00〉E − |e01〉E)
+|1〉〈1|M ⊗ ( 1
2K
|g−〉〈g−|E + 1
2K
|e01〉〈e01|E).
The mixed states of some certain compound systems have
been derived above. Then we compute their von Neu-
mann entropy one by one to bound the final key rate r .
Firstly, we compute the von Neumann entropy of system
BME. In order to compute S(ρBME), we rewrite it as a
classical quantum state
ρBME = P (0, 0)|0, 0〉〈0, 0|BM ⊗ ρ(0,0)E (54)
+P (1, 0)|0, 1〉〈0, 1|BM ⊗ ρ(1,0)E
+P (0, 1)|1, 1〉〈1, 1|BM ⊗ ρ(0,1)E
+P (1, 1)|1, 0〉〈1, 0|BM ⊗ ρ(1,1)E ,
where
ρ
(0,0)
E =
P (|g+〉E − |g−〉E)
tr(P (|g+〉E − |g−〉E)) , (55)
ρ
(1,0)
E =
|g−〉〈g−|E
〈g−|g−〉 , (56)
ρ
(0,1)
E =
|e01〉〈e01|
〈e01|e01〉 , (57)
ρ
(1,1)
E =
P (|e00〉E − |e01〉E)
tr(P (|e00〉E − |e01〉E)) . (58)
According to Eq. (7), we can figure out S(ρBME) as
S(ρBME) = H(P (i, j))i,j +
∑
i,j
P (i, j)S(ρ
(i,j)
E ) (59)
≥ H(P (0, 0), P (0, 1), P (1, 0), P (1, 1)).
Note that here we utilize the truth of S(ρ
(i,j)
E ) ≥ 0. Next,
we compute the von Neumann entropy of systemME. At
first, we rewrite ρME as
ρME = k1|0〉〈0|M ⊗ ρ1E + k2|1〉〈1|M ⊗ ρ2E , (60)
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k1 = P (0, 0) + P (1, 1), k2 = P (0, 1) + P (1, 0), (61)
ρ1E =
P (|g+〉E − |g−〉E) + P (|e00〉E − |e01〉E)
4(q(0, 0) + q(1, 1))
, (62)
ρ2E =
|g−〉〈g−|E + |e01〉〈e01|E
2(q(0, 1) + q(1, 0))
, (63)
q(0, 0) =
1
4
tr(P (|g+〉E − |g−〉E)) (64)
=
1
4
(1 − 2Re〈g+|g−〉),
q(0, 1) =
1
2
tr(|e01〉〈e01|E) = 1
2
〈e01|e01〉, (65)
q(1, 0) =
1
2
tr(|g−〉〈g−|E) = 1
2
〈g−|g−〉, (66)
q(1, 1) =
1
4
tr(P (|e00〉E − |e01〉E)) (67)
=
1
4
(1 − 2Re〈e00|e01〉).
We can see ρME is a classical-quantum state. Then
S(ρME) can be figured out as
S(ρME) = h(k1) + k1S(ρ
1
E) + k2S(ρ
2
E). (68)
Therefore, we can find an upper bound of S(ρME) as
S(ρME) ≤ h(k1) + k2 + k1S(ρ1E) (69)
since ρ2E is a two dimensional density operator, satisfying
S(ρ2E) ≤ 1. (70)
Then we can further get the lower bound on the key rate
r as
r ≥ H(P (i, j)ij)− h(k1)− k2 − k1S(ρ1E)
−H(B|A). (71)
In order to derive an expression of a lower bound of r,
we need to express S(ρ1E) and H(B|A) by using the ob-
servable statistics. Then we compute S(ρ1E) and H(B|A)
one by one.
First of all, we compute S(ρ1E). According to Eqs.
(8) and (9), we need to get all eigenvalues of ρ1E . Let
|l1〉E = |g+〉E − |g−〉E , |l2〉E = |e00〉E − |e01〉E . Then we
can rewrite ρ1E as follows:
ρ1E =
|l1〉〈l1|E + |l2〉〈l2|E
〈l1|l1〉+ 〈l2|l2〉 . (72)
Let |l1〉 = x|ξ〉 and |l2〉 = y|ξ〉 + z|η〉, where x, y, z ∈ C,
〈ξ|ξ〉 = 〈η|η〉 = 1 and 〈ξ|η〉 = 0. This indicates:
|x|2 = 〈l1|l1〉 = 4q(0, 0), (73)
|y|2 + |z|2 = 〈l2|l2〉 = 4q(1, 1), (74)
x∗y = 〈l1|l2〉, (75)
|y|2 = |〈l1|l2〉|
2
|x|2 . (76)
Then we can write ρ1E as a matrix in the basis of {|ξ〉, |η〉}:
ρ1E =
1
|x|2 + |y|2 + |z|2
( |x|2 + |y|2 yz∗
y∗z |z|2
)
. (77)
Its eigenvalues are
λ± =
1
2
±
√
k3 + 2k4
2(|x|2 + |y|2 + |z|2) , (78)
where
k3 = |x|4 + |y|4 + |z|4, (79)
k4 = |x|2|y|2 + |y|2|z|2 − |x|2|z|2. (80)
Through some mathematical skills and combining Eqs.
(77)(78)(79) and (80), we can have
λ± =
1
2
±
√
4(q(0, 0)− q(1, 1))2 + |〈l1|l2〉|2
4(q(0, 0) + q(1, 1))
. (81)
Thus, we can compute S(ρ1E) as
S(ρ1E) = h(λ+). (82)
From Eq. (81), we can see λ+ ≥ 12 , and thus h(λ+)
will increase as λ+ decreases. Therefore, we can find
an upper bound of S(ρ1E) by finding a lower bound of
|〈l1|l2〉|2. Assume B ≥ 0 is a lower bound of |〈l1|l2〉| and
define
λ =
1
2
+
√
4(q(0, 0)− q(1, 1))2 + B2
4(q(0, 0) + q(1, 1))
. (83)
Therefore, we have found an upper bound of S(ρ1E) as
S(ρ1E) ≤ h(λ). (84)
Next, we compute H(B|A) by the observable statistics
P (i, j)ij . We can easily get
H(BA) = H({P (i, j)}ij). (85)
Because
PA(0) = P (0, 0) + P (0, 1), (86)
PA(1) = P (1, 0) + P (1, 1), (87)
where PA(i), i ∈ {0, 1}means the probability of the event
that Alice’s raw key bit is i. Then we have,
H(A) = h(PA(0)) = h(P (0, 0) + P (0, 1)). (88)
Thus,
H(B|A) = H(BA)−H(A) (89)
= H({P (i, j)}ij)− h(P (0, 0) + P (0, 1)).
Therefore, we can obtain a lower bound on the final key
rate as
r ≥ h(P (0, 0) + P (0, 1))− h(k1)− k2 − k1h(λ). (90)
From the above inequation, we can see all the parame-
ters can be estimated by A and B except |〈l1|l2〉|’s lower
bound B. Next, we also consider to use some other ob-
servable statistics to determine a value of B.
8C. Bounding |〈l1|l2〉| using observable statistics
In this part, we need to express a lower bound of
|〈l1|l2〉| by using some statistics that can be observed by
the legitimate users. Recall that |l1〉E = |g+〉E − |g−〉E
and |l2〉E = |e00〉E−|e01〉E . From Eq. (25) and Eq. (26),
we can derive that
|l1〉E =
√
2α|e01〉E +
√
2β|e11〉E . (91)
Thus,
〈l1|l2〉 =
√
2α〈e01|e00〉 −
√
2α〈e01|e01〉 (92)
−
√
2β〈e11|e01〉+
√
2β〈e11|e00〉.
Then, we can easily get
〈l2|l1〉 = 〈l1|l2〉 =
√
2α〈e00|e01〉 −
√
2α〈e01|e01〉 (93)
−
√
2β〈e01|e11〉+
√
2β〈e00|e11〉.
Considering that
|〈l2|l1〉| = |〈l1|l2〉|
=
√
(Re〈l2|l1〉)2 + (Im〈l2|l1〉)2, (94)
we can specify B as
|〈l2|l1〉| ≥ B =
√
(Re〈l2|l1〉)2 = |Re〈l2|l1〉|. (95)
More specifically,
B = |Re(
√
2α〈e00|e01〉 −
√
2α〈e01|e01〉 (96)
−
√
2β〈e01|e11〉+
√
2β〈e00|e11〉)|.
We define
B =
{
Re〈l2|l1〉, Re〈l2|l1〉 ≥ 0,
−Re〈l2|l1〉, Re〈l2|l1〉 < 0.
(97)
Thus, we can use observable statistics to bound |〈l1|l2〉|
by specifying Re〈l2|l1〉. In order to specify Re〈l2|l1〉,
we need to specify
√
2αRe〈e00|e01〉,
√
2αRe〈e01|e01〉,√
2βRe〈e01|e11〉 and
√
2βRe〈e00|e11〉. Next, we specify
them one by one.
1.
√
2αRe〈e00|e01〉:
From Eq. (67), we can get
√
2αRe〈e00|e01〉 =
√
2α
2
− 2
√
2αq(1, 1). (98)
2.
√
2αRe〈e01|e01〉:
According to Eq. (45), we can have
〈e01|e01〉 = eZ . (99)
This implies 〈e01|e01〉 is a real number, and there-
fore, Re〈e01|e01〉 = 〈e01|e01〉. Then we can specify
it as
√
2αRe〈e01|e01〉 =
√
2α〈e01|e01〉 =
√
2αeZ . (100)
3.
√
2βRe〈e01|e11〉:
At this point, we focus on the process that Bob
chooses CTRL and Alice measures in the Z-basis
and observes |1〉. We use P (KA = 0|KB = 0) to
denote the probability of the event that Alice mea-
sures in Z-basis and observes |1〉 under the circum-
stance that Bob chooses to CTRL. We abbreviate
P (KA = 0|KB = 0) as P (0|0). Firstly, we model
this process as
ρTE = U |e, 0〉〈e, 0|TEU∗ (101)
= P (|0, αe00 + βe10〉TE + |1, αe01 + βe11〉TE).
Then Alice measures in Z-basis and observes |1〉
with the probability P (0|0).
P (0|0) = tr(|1〉〈1|T ⊗ I)ρTE (102)
= 2αβRe〈e01|e11〉+ α2〈e01|e01〉+ β2〈e11|e11〉
= 2αβRe〈e01|e11〉+ (α2 − β2)〈e01|e01〉+ β2.
Here we have used Eqs.(18)(19) and the assump-
tion of symmetrical property which is often used
in QKD security proof. Thus, we can specify√
2βRe〈e01|e11〉 as
√
2βRe〈e01|e11〉 (103)
=
√
2
2α
[P (0|0)− (α2 − β2)eZ − β2].
4.
√
2βRe〈e00|e11〉:
At this time, we pay attention to the process that
Alice measures in the X-basis and observes |−〉
when Bob chooses to CTRL. We use P (1|0) to de-
note the probability of the event that Alice mea-
sures in the X-basis and observes |−〉 under the
circumstance Bob chooses to CTRL. Then we can
compute it as
P (1|0) = 〈g−|g−〉 (104)
=
1
2
− α2Re〈e00|e01〉 − αβRe〈e00|e11〉
−αβRe〈e01|e10〉 − β2Re〈e10|e11〉.
Then we can derive that
√
2βRe〈e00|e11〉 =
√
2
α
[
1
2
− P (1|0)− α2(1
2
(105)
−2q(1, 1))− αβRe〈e01|e10〉 − β2Re〈e10|e11〉].
We can see the right side of the Eq. (105) still con-
tains the expression Re〈e01|e10〉 and Re〈e10|e11〉.
Here we cannot specify them using the observable
9statistics, but we can bound them by using the
Cauchy-Schwarz inequality:
|〈e01|e10〉| ≤
√
〈e01|e01〉〈e10|e10〉 (106)
= |〈e01|e01〉| = eZ ,
|〈e10|e11〉| ≤
√
〈e10|e10〉〈e11|e11〉 (107)
=
√
eZ(1− eZ).
Thus,
Re〈e01|e10〉 ≤
√
(Re〈e01|e10〉)2 (108)
≤
√
〈e01|e01〉〈e10|e10〉 = eZ ,
Re〈e10|e11〉 ≤
√
(Re〈e10|e11〉)2 (109)
≤
√
〈e10|e10〉〈e11|e11〉 =
√
eZ(1− eZ).
Then we can find a lower bound of
√
2βRe〈e00|e11〉
as
√
2βRe〈e00|e11〉 ≥
√
2
α
[
1
2
− P (1|0)− α2(1
2
(110)
−2q(1, 1))− αβeZ − β2
√
eZ(1− eZ)].
From the above, we can get a lower bound on |〈l1|l2〉| as
|〈l1|l2〉| ≥ B =
√
2α
2
− 2
√
2αq(1, 1)−
√
2αeZ (111)
−
√
2
2α
[P (0|0)− (α2 − β2)eZ − β2]
+
√
2
α
[
1
2
− P (1|0)− α2(1
2
− 2q(1, 1))
−αβeZ − β2
√
eZ(1− eZ)].
Note that here we can ensure B to be positive by con-
trolling the noise in the forward and reverse quantum
channel. This is reasonable because the protocol should
be aborted if there is too much noise.
From the above, all the parameters appeared in the
right hand of Eq. (90) are specified by the observable
statistics. Then we have found a lower bound of the key
rate r which is expressed as a function of channel param-
eters because all the observable statistics are determined
by the quantum channel. Thus, we can compute a thresh-
old value of the error rate such that the key rate r can
always be positive when all the errors are less than this
value. In other words, the secure key can be established
successfully as long as all the error rates are less than the
threshold value. Finally, the full security proof restricted
on Eve’s collective attack is completed.
In order to get the whole unconditional security proof,
we need to spread the circumstance of collective attack
to general attack. Fortunately, Renner et al [17] proved
that it suffices to consider the collective attack if pro-
tocols are permutation invariant. Next, we will show
our protocol is permutation invariant by reducing it to
a B92 protocol with small modifications. Though our
protocol relies on a two-way quantum channel, Krawec
[14] has proved that all the attacks can be equivalent to
a restricted attack. Then we can reduce our protocol to
a fully quantum key distribution protocol with one-way
quantum channel. Specifically, it can be reduced to a pro-
tocol that Bob prepares a state of set {|0〉, |e〉} at random
and Alice measures in Z or X basis randomly, which is a
kind of modified B92 protocol. Renner et al [17] showed
that B92 is permutation invariant. Therefore, our proto-
col is permutation invariant as well. Thus we can derive
that our protocol can be secure against general attack.
The whole unconditional security proof is completed.
D. Example
In this part, we illustrate how to compute the thresh-
old value of the error rates under the circumstance that
the reverse channel is a depolarizing one with parameter
p. The depolarization channel is a typical scenario con-
sidered in the unconditional security proofs of some other
protocols [12, 19, 20]. It can be specified as follows:
ξp(ρ) = (1− p)ρ+ p
2
I, (112)
where I is the identity operator.
We model Eve’s attack in the reverse channel after
Bob’s action as follows:
1. SIFT:
ξp(|0〉〈0|T ) = (1− p
2
)|0〉〈0|T + p
2
|1〉〈1|T . (113)
2. CTRL:
ξp(|e〉〈e|T ) = (1− p
2
)|e〉〈e|T + p
2
|e⊥〉〈e⊥|T , (114)
where |e⊥〉 is a state orthogonal to |e〉, that is to
say,
|e⊥〉 =
√
1
2
− b|0〉 −
√
1
2
+ b|1〉. (115)
Then we can get the mixed state of the compound system
after an iteration:
ρ =
1
2
|1〉〈1|B ⊗ ξp(|0〉〈0|T )
+
1
2
|0〉〈0|B ⊗ ξp(|e〉〈e|). (116)
Next, we compute the parameters appeared in Eqs.(94)
and (115) one by one.
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Firstly, we compute q(i, j), i, j ∈ {0, 1} in terms of the
parameters of b and p :
q(0, 0) = tr[(|0〉〈0|B ⊗ |1〉〈1|T )ρ] (117)
=
1
4
− b
2
+
pb
2
,
q(0, 1) = tr[(|1〉〈1|B ⊗ |1〉〈1|T )ρ] = p
4
, (118)
q(1, 0) = tr[(|0〉〈0|B ⊗ |−〉〈−|T )ρ] (119)
=
1
4
− (1− p)
√
1− 4b2
4
,
q(1, 1) = tr[(|1〉〈1|B ⊗ |−〉〈−|T )ρ] = 1
4
. (120)
Then we can derive
K =
∑
i,j
q(i, j) (121)
=
3
4
− b
2
+
pb
2
+
p
4
− (1− p)
√
1− 4b2
4
.
Thus we can get P (i, j), i, j ∈ {0, 1}:
P (0, 0) =
1− 2b+ 2pb
3− 2b+ 2pb+ p− (1 − p)√1− 4b2 ,(122)
P (0, 1) =
p
3− 2b+ 2pb+ p− (1 − p)√1− 4b2 ,(123)
P (1, 0) =
1− (1 − p)√1− 4b2
3− 2b+ 2pb+ p− (1 − p)√1− 4b2 ,(124)
P (1, 1) =
1
3− 2b+ 2pb+ p− (1 − p)√1− 4b2 .(125)
Next, we compute eZ , P (0|0) and P (1|0) as follows:
eZ = tr[|1〉〈1|ξp(|0〉〈0|)] = p
2
; (126)
P (0|0) = tr[|1〉〈1|ξp(|e〉〈e|)] = 1
2
− b+ pb; (127)
P (1|0) = tr[|−〉〈−|ξp(|e〉〈e|)] (128)
=
1
2
−
√
1
4
− b2 + p
√
1
4
− b2.
Thus, we can get a lower bound on the key rate r accord-
ing to Eq. (90) as
r ≥ f(b, p), (129)
f(b, p) = h(P (0, 0) + P (0, 1))− h(P (0, 0) (130)
+P (1, 1))− (P (0, 1) + P (1, 0))− (P (0, 0) + P (1, 1))h(λ).
b = 0 b = 0.1 b = 0.15 b = 0.2 b = 0.25
p = 0.0262 p = 0.0441
p = 0.0557 p = 0.0637 p = 0.0692
0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08
-0.2
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
FIG. 1. A graph of our lower bound on the key rate of this
SQKD protocol as a function of the depolarization channel
parameter p for different b. Note that, eZ =
p
2
.
Then we can specify f(b, p) as
f(b, p) = h(
1− 2b+ 2pb+ p
K ′
)− h(2− 2b+ 2pb
K ′
) (131)
−1 + p− (1− p)
√
1− 4b2
K ′
− 2− 2b+ 2pb
K ′
h(λ),
K ′ = 3 + p+ (p− 1)
√
1− 4b2 + 2b(p− 1), (132)
λ =
1
2
+
√
(pb− b)2 + B2
2− 2b+ 2pb , (133)
B = 2√
1 + 2b
[
√
1− 4b2(1
2
− 3p
4
) (134)
−1
2
(
1
2
− b)
√
2p− p2]− p
2
√
1− 2p.
A graph of the lower bound of the key rate r as a
function of p for different b is shown in Figure 1. In the
graph, we can see when b = 0, the key rate r is positive for
all p ≤ 0.0692, which means that when eZ = p2 ≤ 3.46%,
the key rate will always be positive. Different values of b
correspond to different threshold values which assure the
key rate r is positive. We can see when the absolute value
of b is far from 0, the threshold value becomes smaller,
which demonstrates that the noise in the forward channel
has an effect on the final key rate in some extent.
A graph of the lower bound of the key rate r as a
function of b for different p is shown in Figure 2. In
this graph, we can see the lower bound decreases sharply
when the parameter p increases a little. This indicates
that the noise in the reverse channel affect it more evi-
dent. Therefore, we have to make more efforts to control
the noise in the reverse channel when the protocol is im-
plemented.
Next, we make a comparison of the protocol with
Krawec’s protocol in [12]. It is proved that Krawec’s
single-state protocol can endure the maximum bit error
rate eZ =
p
2 ≤ 5.36% when the forward channel parame-
ter b = 0 [12]. A graph of the lower bound of the key rate
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FIG. 2. A graph of the lower bound on the key rate of this
SQKD protocol as a function of the forward channel param-
eter b for different p.
r as a function of p in case of b = 0 of the two compared
protocols is shown in Figure 3. In this graph, we can see
p1 = 0.1072 > p2 = 0.0692 and the lower bound’s de-
creasing speed is 2 > 1. These indicate that our protocol
can endure less noise under the circumstance of b = 0.
Under this circumstance, Krawec’s protocol can be con-
sidered as a modified three-state BB84 protocol. Specif-
ically, the sender Bob prepares one of state from the set
{|0〉, |1〉, |+〉} each iteration, but they drops all the itera-
tions when he sends |1〉 to Alice after quantum communi-
cation. It is proved that the asymmetric three-state BB84
can tolerate eZ < 4.36% quantum bit error rate [21], com-
paring to eZ < 9.81% of the symmetric three-state BB84
[21, 22]. Similarly, our protocol can be seen as the B92
protocol mentioned previously. Exactly, Bob prepares
a state from the set {|0〉, |+〉} each iteration. In Ref.
[23], it is proved that B92 can tolerate depolarizing rate
p′ < 0.034(eZ =
2p′
3 < 2.27%). Then the depolarizing
rate has been improved to p′ < 0.036(eZ =
2p′
3 < 2.4%)
in [24]. Finally, Ryutaroh Matsumoto improved the de-
polarizing rate to p′ < 0.065(eZ =
2p′
3 < 4.33%) through
convex optimization method [25]. From above, we can see
the two SQKD protocols are as secure as their fully coun-
terparts. Though our protocol can tolerate less noise, it
can be easily implemented in the real world. This co-
incides the case in fully quantum cryptography. As we
know, B92 is more simple to implement than BB84, it
can endure a maximum bit error rate of less than 4.33%
comparing to 11% of BB84 protocol [21, 24]. In Ref. [21],
it is also shown that more simple the QKD protocol is,
less noise it can endure.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we introduce the idea of B92 into semi-
quantum key distribution and design a new SQKD proto-
1 2
p = 0.0692 p = 0.1072
0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20
-0.5
0.5
1.0
FIG. 3. A graph of the lower bound on the key rate of the
two compared protocols as a function of the reverse channel
parameter p in case of the forward channel parameter b = 0.
Note that: 1 Krawec’s protocol; 2 Our protocol
col with one qubit. To our best of knowledge, this is the
first semi-quantum version of B92 protocol, comparing
to BKM07 as the semi-quantum version of BB84. Then
we show that it is not only more efficient but also more
simplified to implement. Meanwhile, it is demonstrated
that our protocol is as secure as some existed SQKD and
QKD protocols. We provide an unconditional security
proof of our protocol by computing a lower bound of the
final key rate in the asymptotic scenario and found a
threshold value of errors such that if all the errors are
less than this value, the secure key can be established
definitely. We show that our scheme can tolerate a maxi-
mum bit error rate of 3.46% under the circumstance that
there is no noise in the forward channel. It is comparable
to the SQKD protocol BKM07 which can tolerate up to
5.34% error rate under the circumstance that the error
rate in Z-type is equal to the X-type in both forward
and reverse quantum channel [15]. It is also comparable
to Krawec’s newly single-state protocol which can with-
stand up to error rate of 5.36% [12]. Though our protocol
can endure less noise, it needs fewer quantum resource
and equipments which makes it to be more practical and
realizable. It has great advantages in practice under the
circumstance that the quantum channel is less noisy.
From above, we can see the maximum value of noise
that our protocol can tolerate is a little smaller than those
of BKM07 and single-state protocol in Ref. [12]. Prob-
ably the lower bound of the key rate is not tight here,
and we would further improve it to enhance our max-
imum tolerated value in the future. Maybe Ryutaroh
Matsumoto’s method in [25] can give us some tips in this
direction. More importantly, we talk our unconditional
security only in the perfect qubit scenario. It is a chal-
lenge problem to consider the unperfect scenario.
12
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The authors would like to thank the referees for their
very helpful suggestions that greatly helped to improve
the quality of this paper. The authors thank Xiangfu
Zou for checking the protocol designed in the paper and
giving useful suggestions. The authors also thank Zhim-
ing Huang for his help in drafting the graph and math-
ematical software installation. This work is supported
in part by the National Natural Science Foundation of
China (Nos. 61272058, 61572532), the Natural Science
Foundation of Qiannan Normal College for Nationalities
joint Guizhou Province of China (No. Qian-Ke-He LH
Zi[2015]7719), the Natural Science Foundation of Cen-
tral Government Special Fund for Universities of West
China (No. 2014ZCSX17).
[1] Boyer, M., Kenigsberg, D., Mor, T. Phys. Rev. Lett.
99(14), 140501 (2007)
[2] Hua, L., Cai, Q.-Y. Int. J. Quantum Inf. 6(06), 1195-1202
(2008)
[3] Boyer, M.,Gelles, R.,Kenigsberg, D., Mor, T. Phys.
Rev.A 79, 032341(2009)
[4] Zou, X., Qiu, D., Li, L., Wu, L., Li, L. Phys. Rev. A 79,
052312 (2009)
[5] Xian-Zhou, Z.,Wei-Gui, G.,Yong-Gang, T., Zhen-Zhong,
R.,Xiao-Tian, G. Chin. Phys. B 18(6), 2143 (2009)
[6] Jian, W., Sheng, Z., Quan, Z., Chao-Jing, T. Chin. Phys.
Lett. 28(10), 100301 (2011)
[7] Sun, Z.-W., Du,R.-G., Long, D.-Y. Int. J.Quantum Inf.
11(1), 1350005 (2013)
[8] Yu, K.-F., Yang, C.-W., Liao, C.-H., Hwang, T. Quan-
tum Inf. Process. 13(6), 1457-1465 (2014)
[9] Krawec, W.O. Phys. Rev. A 91(3), 032323 (2015)
[10] Zou, X., Qiu, D., Zhang, S., Mateus, P. Quantum Inf.
Process. 14(8), 2981-2996 (2015)
[11] Li, Q., Chan, W.H., Zhang, S. ArXiv preprint
arXiv:1508.07090 (2015)
[12] Krawec W O. Quantum Inf. Process. 15(5), 2067-
2090(2016)
[13] Miyadera, T. Int. J. Quantum Inf. 9(6), 1427-1435 (2011)
[14] Krawec, W.O. Quantum Inf. Process. 13(11), 2417-2436
(2014)
[15] Krawec W O. IEEE International Symposium on Infor-
mation Theory (ISIT). IEEE, 686-690(2015)
[16] Krawec W O. PhD thesis, Stevens Institute of Technol-
ogy, May (2015)
[17] Renato Renner, Nicolas Gisin, and Barbara Kraus. Phys.
Rev. A. 72, 012332(2005)
[18] Devetak I. and Winter A. Proceedings of the Royal Soci-
ety A: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Science,
461(2053),207-235(2005)
[19] Christandl, M., Renner, R. ArXiv preprint
quant-ph/0402131 (2004)
[20] Scarani V, Bechmann-Pasquinucci H, Cerf N J, et al.
Reviews of modern physics, 81(3): 1301 (2009)
[21] Fung C H F, Lo H K. Electrical and Computer Engineer-
ing, 2007. CCECE 2007. Canadian Conference on. IEEE
: 1121-1124 (2007)
[22] Boileau J C, Tamaki K, Batuwantudawe J, et al. Phys.
Rev. A. 94(4): 040503 (2005)
[23] Tamaki K, Koashi M, Imoto N. Phys. rev. Lett, 90(16):
167904 (2003)
[24] Christandl M, Renner R, Ekert A. arXiv preprint
quant-ph/0402131 (2004)
[25] Matsumoto R. IEEE International Symposium on Infor-
mation Theory (ISIT). IEEE, 351-353 (2013)
